

Nationalism, Internationalism, and Russia's Future

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Introduction

“If a great people does not believe that the truth is to be found in it alone, if it does not believe that it alone is fit and destined to rise up and save all by its truth, it at once ceases to be a great nation, and at once turns into ethnographical material and not into a great people. A truly great people can never reconcile itself with a secondary role in humanity or even with a first, but without fail must exclusively play the first role. A nation which loses this belief ceases to be a nation.”¹

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union it has become commonplace to read, both in trade and specialist publications, that Russians are being confronted with a crisis of identity. The questioning of Russian identity began with the loss of Eastern Europe which was a great part of the Soviet leadership's and Russian people's idea of Russia as a great European political, military, and economic power. Another part of Russian self-concept, the Soviet Union, came to an end soon after the collapse of Socialist Europe. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, a process

encouraged by Russia, has deprived Russians of the seventy year old concept of themselves as a country with a mission, and has forced them to rethink what it means to be Russian. It has been necessary, since 1991, for the new non-communist Russia to redefine itself in its relations and role within the CIS, with the old Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe, and in the larger international context. This paper will explore the recent changes in Russia's concept of itself and its relationship with its neighbors.

From the time of Gorbachev's call for perestroika and glasnost to the present Yeltsin administration, Russian policy advisors' ideas of Russia's place in the world and its relationships with neighboring post-Soviet states have gone through three identifiable phases. First, in the late Gorbachev era, Russian thinking and policy centered upon the acceptance of a Western liberal internationalist perspective.² In this view Russia was to take its place among the democratic European countries in their "common European home." The second phase of Russian thinking, which probably reached its zenith with the parliamentary elections of December 1993 and noteworthy more for its influence on the current third phase of thinking than for any direct contribution to policy, could be labeled radical nationalism. This phase was characterized by a rejection of radical political, economic and social reform inspired by Western theorists, with a turning inward toward the Russian Federation and accompanied by not so subtle calls for the re-establishment of Russian domination over the post-Soviet space and even sometimes beyond. The last phase of Russian thinking has centered on the acknowledgment that Russia is part of both Eastern Europe and part of Asia, and that because of the high level of interdependence among the CIS states, Russian economic hegemony in

the area is the only viable path given the current economic and political threats to Russia's security.

Phase 1: Western Liberal Internationalism

The first phase of changes in Russia's identity began at the end of the Gorbachev era and was often labeled as his 'new political thinking.' The concepts embodied in this new thinking have been closely linked to a Western oriented liberal internationalism.³ The new thinking involved a turning away from the ideology of confrontation between East and West. Its most basic proposition was that all of humanity shared common and universal interests that were more important than the individual interests of states or the struggle between capitalism and socialism. Some of the issues that were deemed important were: the avoidance of nuclear war, protection of the global environment, integration and growth in the international economy, and protection of human rights. It was acknowledged that the world economy had become a single system and that, out of the necessity for survival, all countries would have to integrate into it, and that to be isolated from the world community would lead to economic decline and technological suicide.⁴

Gorbachev also acknowledged the concept of a security dilemma between competing nations. In this concept the unilateral increase in either strategic nuclear or conventional weapons would be counter-productive for one's security because adversaries would find it necessary to respond in kind. In the end both sides would be more vulnerable and also saddled with enormous and growing defense costs. The ruin of the Soviet economy, largely caused by the arms race, was a case in point. The need for conventional and nuclear arms

control became an important part of Russian elite thinking. Russian thinking on security redefined the security concept from safety in 'mutually assured destruction' to safety in 'mutually assured non-aggression.' Security came to be redefined in terms of how safe from aggression one's potential adversaries felt.

The concept of what constituted the self-interest of the Soviet Union also changed during this time. Gorbachev and his advisors did not ignore the interests of the Soviet empire but national interest began to be more strongly defined in terms of international cooperation rather than confrontation. Thus, the security of the Soviet Union could be more readily guaranteed if it was integrated into Western security organizations such as NATO, and with the strengthening of the CSCE, of which Russia was a member. The right of former Warsaw-Pact members to join NATO or other security systems without interference from Russia was acknowledged. There were even suggestions for the creation of an all European collective security system, and also calls for strengthening and deepening United Nations involvement in global issues with Russia's involvement.⁵

Russia's relations with the CIS were also being redefined. Both Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev (1992) embraced a liberal internationalist view of Russia's future involvement in the CIS. Although wanting to maintain close economic ties with the former Soviet republics, they rejected the idea that Russian regional hegemony was a historical right, or even that Russia had a distinctive relationship with the countries on its borders. They called on Europe to take an active role in calming numerous conflicts in the region, including the use of military forces under UN, NATO or CSCE command for peacekeeping purposes. Although Russia was still considered to be

a great power, integration with the West was of primary importance.

The above changes in Russian ideology and policy were dominant in the late Gorbachev era and also dominated Russian Federation policy in the early months after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Phase 2: Russian Nationalism

The second identifiable phase of Russian identity and policy is nationalism, both the radical left and right.

Nationalists, who have always been present in Russian politics in one form or another, obtained major political prominence and world wide attention with their stunning victory in the December 1993 parliamentary elections. When nationalists, ultra-nationalists, and imperial-restorationists gained nearly twenty-five percent of the popular vote Western analysts concluded that Russians were on their way to solving their identity crisis by reverting to imperialism.⁶

The nationalists who gained such prominence cover a wide spectrum of political beliefs, both radical left and right. Because of space limitations I have chosen to divide nationalists into two main groups: those who wish to maintain and strengthen the Russian state, often within the boundaries of the Russian Federation; and those nationalists who wish to recreate the imperial or Soviet empire.⁷ Within these two main arms of the nationalist political movement many sub-groups with differing opinions exist.

Russia for Russians

Some Russian nationalists are much in favor of creating a 'Russian' homeland. These nationalists are against Russians settling outside the

Russian Federation and would encourage those ethnic Russians living outside the republic to return 'home'. They feel that the Russian diaspora will ultimately lead to the extinction of Russians as an ethnic group, and so encourage the development of greater self-consciousness as an ethnic entity and nation. Some within this group advocate political and economic decentralization, while others are in favor of complete removal of restrictions on freedom of expression and, especially, religion. There are some nationalists who feel that Russian hegemony, whether it be economic, political, or military, is immoral and debases Russian morality.

On the other hand, some nationalists consider Russia to be something very different from the Russian Federation. They see Russia in historical, cultural, ethnic, and geographical boundaries that include areas that others do not recognize as Russian lands. Even within this group, the geographical boundaries that define their Russia differ; some nationalists would exclude the Baltic States but include the Caucasuses, others would exclude both of these but include Ukraine and Belarus, and so on.

The one concept that these different groups have in common is the idea of creating a homeland; a Russian nation-state. Their goal is not to recreate the empire but to build a Russian state that is ruled by and for ethnic Russians.

Reestablishing the Soviet Space

The other main group of Russian nationalists would like to see, in some form or another, the re-establishment of a Russian empire. They often regard the boundaries of the defunct Soviet Union as the legitimate context for a future Russian state. Some of them would ex-

tend the limits of a new Russian state further, for example, Vladimir Zhirinovsky not only claims the Caucasus as historically Russian, but Finland and Poland as well. Those within this group have many differences as to how the reestablished empire would be governed, whether in the imperial or Soviet mold or some other authoritarian regime, but they all hold one basic concept to be true; most of the former Soviet space is the real Russia and the regaining of territory and then preserving its integrity is paramount.

The Common Thread

The policy reforms of the Russian government in the late Gorbachev and early Yeltsin administrations coincided with the precipitous fall of the Soviet, and later the Russian economy. At the same time Russia was losing its standing and influence in international relations and was also being marginalized by its former satellite states and republics. Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's turn towards the West, their endless trips to Western capitals with cup in hand, were seen as degrading and emasculating to Russian nationalists. One result was an increase in xenophobic and chauvinistic nationalist feelings.

To nationalists, the West was not just a bank with which to fund the resuscitation of the Russian economy. It was also an ideological and cultural challenge to distinct Russian purity and Orthodox culture. The transplanted Western economic policies embraced by Gorbachev reformers were seen as a sellout to Western economic interests. The proposed political reforms were the antithesis to Russian universalism and authoritarianism.

The West has also been a military threat throughout Russia's history; no one could ever forget the many invasions by Swedish, Polish,

French and German armies. Thus, the idea of joining NATO, of cooperating with United Nations Peacekeeping operations, and finally, inviting UN peacekeeping forces into the CIS to manage conflicts, was seen as the final surrender of Russian sovereignty. President Bush's call for a 'new world order' was nothing more than justification for US hegemony, and Gorbachev's seemingly uncritical embrace of this and similar Western ideas was tantamount to treason.

Some Nationalists argued that it was necessary for Russia to reassert control over the newly independent CIS republics. In their view, Russia had every right to defend the rights of Russians living in the republics, even if military force was necessary. They also justified their position by the old argument that Russia had strong historical and geopolitical reasons for intervention, and that the CIS was Russia's special and natural sphere of influence because of security, economic and cultural reasons. This was especially so because they now divided Europe into three parts, each in some way a potential threat to Russia; the Western states, which were the fundamental threat to Russia; Central Europe, which because of its historical and cultural links to Russia was of special interest and affinity; and the CIS.⁸

Finally, nationalists differentiate little between patriotism and chauvinism. To them, nationalism is the most important and sacred part of life and only by belonging to a nation, the Russian nation, does one's life gain meaning. Differences between countries will always exist, but the obligation to one's nation surpasses any other commitment.

Phase 3: The Middle Ground Under Yeltsin

As stated above, Yeltsin initially supported the liberal internationalist policies and perspective of Gorbachev. But the continuing decline of

the Russian economy, conflicts on the borders of the Russian Federation, and especially the surprising outcome of the 1993 parliamentary elections caused him to change policies in an effort to consolidate support from emerging political parties as well as the military.

After his split with Gorbachev, Yeltsin and members of his administration began to criticize what they viewed was an excessive Western orientation in economic and military policy. They also started to appropriate some of the rhetoric of nationalist groups when discussing Russian policy in the CIS, and took up the cause of ethnic Russians living in the non-Russian republics.

For example, in August 1993 he confirmed that the Soviet Union's former East European allies, as sovereign states, had every right to define their own security needs and develop alliances that fulfilled those needs. One month later, just after he settled the political stalemate with parliament by using the Russian army and just prior to the coming elections, he reversed himself, stating that the inclusion of the former Warsaw Pact nations in NATO was detrimental to Russian security and inconsistent with the traditional right of Russia to have a say on issues in the region. His reversal on this issue was undoubtedly an effort to gain support from the military, nationalist groups, and centrists in an effort to resolve the domestic political crisis to his advantage.

He also criticized the policies of the Foreign Affairs Ministry under both Shevardnadze and Kozyrev, contending that their internationalist policies were not in the best interest of Russia, and had actually weakened the Russian Federation by putting political, military and economic policy decisions in the hands of pro-West reformers.

Yeltsin also asserted that given the new geopolitical environment in

which Russia found itself, the small but dangerous threats in some of the fourteen new states on the immediate periphery of the Russian Federation which could have direct and negative affects on the economy and security of Russia required the ability and willingness to act independently of any restrictions the West wished to impose. Although Yeltsin was an early supporter for some kind of universal collective security system that would encompass all of Europe, he again changed policy and became an advocate for Russian leadership in the security and economic affairs of the region. In a reversal of Foreign Minister Kozyrev's position rejecting any special Russian right to influence regional affairs, he maintained that UN peacekeeping operations should take a regional rather than a global view in conflict management and then went on to use the CIS as an example. There was also staunch resistance to outside security forces, be it UN, NATO, or CSCE forces, operating in any of the CIS republics or former Warsaw Pact nations.

That the public reversal of past policies was not only a propaganda ploy to gain political support but a concrete change in policy is shown by a publication issued by the Foreign Ministry at the end of 1992, the "Document of Russia's Foreign Policy." Russian policy towards the CIS was given the highest priority. Goals to achieve included the strengthening of Russia's borders, the protection of ethnic Russians in the non-Russian republics, the development and maintenance of an inter-republic economic and financial system within the CIS, and improvement of transportation within the CIS. It also called for Russian mediation and military intervention for peacekeeping in areas of conflict in the CIS, and stated that military or political presence of third parties in the CIS or other post-Soviet states on Russia's borders

would not be tolerated.

The results of the new policy goals of the Yeltsin administration, detailed in the policy document, have been reported in several sources.⁹ In short, Russia's new policy and attitude towards the CIS is one of instituting, expanding and strengthening economic hegemony in the region. Russia has repeatedly used economic blackmail to force compliance with Russia's wishes. It has coerced some republics into a CIS economic union and forced other republics that are considered a financial drain on Russia into unwanted and unsustainable economic interdependence. Russia has also intervened militarily in several cases and has, as a result, caused the downfall of several of the more independently minded republic administrations. There has been covert and in some cases overt military intervention and aid to secessionist movements, most notably in the Georgian Republic, and, of course, there is now the savage war in Chechnya. Some of these interventions have been blamed on faults in the chain of command in Moscow, or on Russian deserters, mercenaries, or over-zealous commanders and troops. But the consistency of Russian interference seems to indicate that the real cause is a deliberate policy of guaranteeing dependent regimes in the republics.

Changes in Policy and Direction

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union there has been a definite change in the degree of influence the three groups of ideas discussed above have had on Russian thinking and policy. The whole spectrum of Russian political thinking, and the parallel idea of what Russia's role should be in the 'new world order', has taken a considerable move to the right and become more nationalistic.¹⁰ Reasons for this move to

the right are to be found in Russia's security and economic problems and also in Russia's search for a new identity and role in Europe.

The liberal internationalism of Gorbachev and the early period after Russian independence and the European and Western orientation associated with it has mostly disappeared. It was not sustainable, in part, because it ignored the important question of Russia's role in the new world order, along with Russian identity which disappeared with the demise of the Soviet Union. The radical nationalism which appeared to be gaining mass appeal in 1992 and for which the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, an extreme radical without much real mass support¹¹, and who, unfortunately, has been chosen as a representative of this movement by the Western press, still remains on the fringe of Russian policy and ideology but is, nevertheless, a potential threat to political moderation. Fortunately, the aspirations of radical nationalists may demand far too many military and economic resources and contain the potential to cause serious internal and foreign relation problems to be viewed as a viable alternative by the public at large. And although many Russians would welcome a return to the old boundaries of the Soviet Union, memories of past repressions lead them to fear the strong center that radical nationalism could easily produce.¹²

Since about 1992, those who shape Russian policy and posture appear to have reached a consensus on where Russia's interests lie and on what actions to take to secure those interests. What has come to dominate is a more assertive and aggressive policy using cooperation and confrontation in order to secure Russian hegemony in the region, centering on the CIS states.¹³

To account for this shift from outward looking policies of 1991-92 to the much more assertive current policies of the Yeltsin administration,

one must look at the social, military, economic, and political realities that the Russian Federation faces, and also to the resurgence of Eurasian thought in policy circles.

The isolationist and independent line the Russian Federation and many of the CIS states first embarked on during the late Gorbachev era was considered impossible to sustain because of the close economic, political, military and social interdependence of the region.¹⁴ When the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred there were more than twenty-five million Russian speakers living in the states of the near abroad. When some of the newly independent CIS states instituted laws that put these former elites at a disadvantage, ethnic and nationalist sentiments were raised in Russia in their defense. It also raised the possibility of mass migration of Russian speakers into the Russian federation, a migration that would be economically disastrous to Russia. Also, the Russian army was spread out throughout the CIS states. The recall of the army to within the borders of Russia has proven to be logistically and financially burdensome. There is insufficient housing, schools and other necessary support materials to meet the needs of the hundreds of thousands of returning troops that would be competing with local civilian populations for already scarce resources. This problem was made more difficult because of the thousands of troops already returning to Russia from Central Europe. Then there was the problem of Russian military facilities and ordinances still in the CIS, especially the question of control over nuclear weapons and strategically located port facilities such as the Black Sea Fleet. The heavy interdependence of the regional economies continues to make Russia vulnerable to economic decisions made independently by CIS countries. Some of the former Soviet republics continued to use the ru-

ble even after independence, and some republics fiscal decisions made independently of Moscow were often thought to be contrary to the interests of Russia. Arbitrary stoppages of shipments of raw materials and energy significantly disrupted some parts of the Russian economy. Finally, political instability in the CIS often has direct consequences for Russia. For example, the civil wars in Georgia and Azerbaidzhan were intricately related to similar minority populations along their common borders. Ethnic conflict along these borders makes control over Russian domestic politics more difficult. All of the above factors have caused Moscow to look for ways to control regional economic, political and military policies.

Growing Russian hegemony is also supported and justified in part by reemerging Eurasian thought. In the current Eurasian belief, the Russian state and the Russian people's distinct characteristics can be found in the cultural consequences of its strategic geopolitical position between Asia and Europe.¹⁵ Because of its position on the periphery of these two civilizations, it is argued, Russia has never become part of nor belonged to either, but has constituted a unique third civilization which incorporated the best of both East and West. The Russian character is believed to be profoundly different from its Western counterpart; it is collective rather than individual, and multi-ethnic and inclusive rather than homogeneous and exclusive. The character of the Russian state within the region has been defined, in part, by the conflict between East and West so that the interests of Russia must lie between East and West. The main focus of Russian attention must, by definition, be on its relationship with the CIS states. Thus, Russian involvement in the CIS states is also justified in terms of cultural affinity and shared history. Some Eurasian apologists justify Russian

economic hegemony in the region by likening Russia's relationships with the CIS states to that of Germany or France with the European Union¹⁶, where their economic leadership is recognized. They also contend that Russian hegemony is a stabilizing factor in the economies of the CIS republics and that Russia is making many sacrifices to support them.¹⁷

Russia's Future Role?

The strategies that Russia has chosen to pursue in the last two to three years are based on ideological, geological and geopolitical perceptions of Russia's place in the world. The 'one Europe' embraced by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze has been replaced by a view of Europe that is hierarchically reorganized into three different parts: the republics of the CIS; the ex-Warsaw Pact states; and Western Europe.

In Eastern Europe, Russia's shifts in policy and thinking apparently have several goals in mind: to limit the amount of Western military and political involvement in the area, to maintain the strong Russian economic and social connections in the region, and finally, as a minimum, to be highly influential in, but ultimately to exercise a veto right over, regional security issues.

The Russian opposition to ex-Warsaw Pact nations joining NATO has less to do with a strategic need for a buffer of neutral states between Russia and the West and is more of a problem of national self-definition.¹⁸ Russians already feel that they are on the periphery of the larger nations' multilateral economic and security policy discussions and formulations. If Poland or the Czech Republic were to join NATO or some other Western security organizations Russians would, not in reality but in their own self-perception, feel even more marginalized.

Maintaining an eastern buffer between Russia and the West makes them feel more comfortable and secure as a nation. They must, however, accept the fact that these states will continue their current policies and eventually integrate with the West. For them to defer to Russia's wishes would imply the acceptance of the idea that Russia's special interests in the area can legitimately interfere with their national sovereignty.

The CIS states are Russia's primary concern because of their proximity and the ideological influences discussed above. Russia's apparent goal of reestablishing primacy in the region has been well under way for the last three years and, by some estimates, very successful.¹⁹ There seems little doubt that Russia's push to reestablish itself in the region as the military as well as the economic leader will continue forward. Few of the CIS states are in a position to oppose Russia because they are either too dependent or interdependent on Russian economic and/or military aid, or are too weak due to internal civil conflicts, sagging economies or unstable political situations.²⁰ However, the heavy handed policies they have been following in some of the republics must, in the end, give way to a more cooperative attitude. The continuance of the current policies could eventually require a more forceful intrusion into the republics which the Russian people seen unprepared to support. Recent popular demonstrations in Moscow and other Russian cities against Russian military involvement in the former republics may be just the beginning of increasing discontent with Yeltsin's current policies.

Further involvement in the internal affairs of the republics has its own dangers for the health of the Russian state. Its own economy is only just now begining to show some signs of growth and stabilization,

so expending resources and energies needed at home in the 'near abroad' could only slow down recovery. Encouraging secessionist movements in its neighbors' territory could also encourage minority secessionist movements in the Russian Federation itself, and could lead to an endless series of splinter groups seeking independence and autonomy. Also, Russian leadership, even if it is only economic leadership, is by no means universally accepted in the region. Nor is the idea of a shared history or cultural affinity accepted as a reasonable justification for hegemony. One need look no further than Bosnia, or the civil wars and secessionist movements already present in the republics, to understand that cultural similarities or histories offer no guarantees of peaceful co-existence among ethnic groups. As long as Russian actions do not threaten Western interests there will be no intervention and scant protest from the West. Western states, by their silence, have tacitly given legitimacy to the Kremlin's view that the CIS is an important Russian sphere of influence. In fact, some in the West see Russia as a stabilizing influence in the region, especially concerning control over nuclear weapons. The US, UN and NATO are already overburdened by peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kuwait and Cambodia to risk any intervention in the East, thus assuring Russians a free hand in the area.

The current trends in Russian thinking and policy are likely to continue, at least for the short term. Russia has a right to be concerned about specific issues in its immediate geographical vicinity that can potentially affect it. Every nation will and does practice self-preservation and pursues independent and sometimes assertive policies of self-interest. But what matters most is what methods are used to achieve those chosen goals. Although Russia's methods are currently

often heavy handed, sometimes brutal and excessive, and lead to charges of imperialism by CIS republics, its ability to obtain needed security and economic concessions by diplomatic means should increase with time. Russia's obvious diplomatic ineptitude in working with some of the republics is understandable for it is now dealing with independent states that only four years ago had all belonged to the same nation. Also, when the CIS was created Russia had no tradition or apparatus in place for working with its new neighbors, nor had the new republics experience working with Russia as equal partners.

Finally, there is hope that the crisis situations around Russia will lessen over time, and as Eastern European countries continue the inevitable integration with their Western neighbors without threatening the integrity of the Russian state, the Russian leadership and people will feel less endangered and in turn be less menacing. They will have more time and resources available to concentrate on building a Russian nation and come to understand that Gorbachev was right after all; to survive, to be a successful and meaningful power in the world, Russia must take its place alongside Western countries in the emerging internationalist world order.

- 1 Said by Shatov in *The Possessed* by Dostoevsky.
- 2 MacFarlane, Neil S., "Russian Conceptions of Europe", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 1994, Vol. 10, #3, p. 235.
- 3 Tamir, Yael, *Liberal Nationalism*, Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1993, p. 34.
- 4 MacFarlane, p. 241.
- 5 MacFarlane, p. 244.
- 6 Solchank, Roman, "Russia, Ukraine and the Imperial Legacy", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 1993, Vol. 9, #4, p. 342.
- 7 Solchank defines these two groups as 'nation builders' and 'empire-savers'. *Ibid.*

- 8 Laqueur, Walter, "Russian Nationalism", *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992/1993, p. 110.
- 9 Among the many sources, two are of particular interest. See: Harris, Chauncy D., "Ethnic Tensions in the Successor Republics in 1993 and Early 1994", *Post-Soviet Geography*, 1994, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 185-203; and Hill, Fiona, and Pamela Jewett, *Back in the USSR: Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy Toward Russia*, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1994.
- 10 Laqueur, p. 108.
- 11 Support for Zhirinovskiy dropped off sharply just after the December 1993 elections. Whitefield, Stephen & Geoffery Evans, "The Russian Election of 1993: Public Opinion and the Transition Experience", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 1994, Vol. 10, #1, p. 50.
- 12 Hough, Jerry F., "The Russian Election of 1993: Public Attitudes Toward Economic Reform and Democratization", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, January/February 1994, p. 78.
- 13 Hill & Jewett: p. 64.
- 14 Migranyan, Andranik. "Near Abroad is vital to Russia-I", *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. XLVI, No. 6, March 9, 1994, p. 4.
- 15 "Rightists See Eurasia as Idea to Revive Russia", *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. XLV, No. 21(1993), p. 11.
- 16 Kozyrev, Andrei, "The Lagging Partnership", *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992/1993, p. 69.
- 17 Ibid. p. 72.
- 18 Szporluk, Roman, "Belarus', Ukraine and The Russian Question: A Comment", *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 1993, Vol. 9, #4, p. 370.
- 19 Hill & Jewett, p. 87.
- 20 Kozyrev, Andrei, (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation), "The Lagging Partnership", *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1994, p. 69.